The Beginning of the End? Unpacking Just Transition at COP28 (2024)

Introduction

Following the 28th Conference of Parties (COP28) in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), climate scientists hailed a “historic” win for climate action, as negotiations culminated in the first agreement that calls on countries to “contribute to… transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly, and equitable manner… by 2050”.¹UNFCCC, “COP28 Agreement Signals ‘Beginning of the End’ of the Fossil Fuel Era,” 13 December 2023, available at https://unfccc.int/news/cop28-agreement-signals-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-fossil-fuel-era The year 2023 has been described as the “beginning of the end”, referring to the beginning of the end of the fossil fuel era. However, the reality of the outcome of the negotiations reflects a stark misalignment of actions and priorities in the face of an increasingly urgent climate crisis. Beyond the agreement’s usual vague language and jargon, other key outcomes failed to set and deliver ambitions for scaling up climate action, particularly on the climate justice and just transition fronts.²Oxford University, “COP28 Expert Comment from across Oxford University,” 13 December 2023, available at https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2023-12-13-cop28-expert-comment-across-oxford-university Indeed, in the absence of time-bound targets, specific language, and any mention of differentiated responsibilities for countries of the Global South, the agreement sets neither precedents nor a roadmap for a truly just transition.

Moreover, while COP28 kicked off with the full operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund, momentum quickly faltered as the Fund’s financial structure failed to recognize the historical responsibility of industrialized countries and allowed them to contribute only on a voluntary basis³Yelenia Gostoli, “Reparations fund ‘historic’, but real fight begins now: Climate campaigner,” Al Jazeera, 02 December 2023, available at https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/12/2/reparations-fund-historic-but-real-fight-begins-now-climate-campaigners#:~:text=In%20UN%20jargon%2C%20'loss%20and,such%20as%20sea%20level%20rise . The result was a pledge of $790 million,⁴Nick Robbins, “COP28: The irresistible rise of the just transition,” 19 December 2023, available at https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/news/cop28-the-irresistible-rise-of-the-just-transition/ less than 0.2% of the more than $400 billion needed annually to address loss and damage in developing countries.⁵UUSC, Standing in Solidarity with Those on the Frontlines in the Climate Crisis: A Loss and Damage Package for COP28, 2023, available at https://assets-global.website-files.com/605869242b205050a0579e87/655b50e163c953059360564d_L%26DC_L%26D_Package_for_COP28_20112023_1227.pdf Meanwhile, 118 countries pledged to triple global renewable energy capacity and scale up energy efficiency efforts by 2030,⁶UNFCCC, “COP28 Agreement Signals ‘Beginning of the End’ of the Fossil Fuel Era,” 13 December 2023, available at https://unfccc.int/news/cop28-agreement-signals-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-fossil-fuel-era highlighting more than ever an urgent need to define fair policies, guidelines, and funding mechanisms to pave the way for a just energy transition.

Just Transition (JT) is a complex and often contested concept that broadly refers to the deep structural changes across systems involving transformative changes to sustain livelihoods and decent jobs in the shift towards a low-carbon economy.[7] Against this backdrop, this article aims to unpack the coverage of just transition throughout COP28, highlighting key developments and shortcomings. The content of this article is largely based on first-hand observations made during my attendance at COP28, coupled with a review of other conference outcomes, including declarations, pledges, work programs, and the Global Stocktake (GST). During the conference, I attended, observed, and participated in talks focused on the just energy transition, to track the evolution of the concept and document its articulation by various actors in the field.

The Just Transition: A Multi-Faceted Narrative

Despite its shortcomings, COP28 marks itself as the most comprehensive conference on JT in the history of multilateral climate negotiations.⁷Nick Robbins, “COP28: The irresistible rise of the just transition,” 19 December 2023, available at https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/news/cop28-the-irresistible-rise-of-the-just-transition/ The Work Program on Just Transition Pathways established at COP27 in Sharm El Sheikh was finally operationalized in Dubai under decision 1/CMA.4.⁸UNFCCC, “UAE Just Transition work programme,” 13 December 2023b, available at https://unfccc.int/documents/636589 While as ambiguous as most COP texts, the work program specifically highlights the following five key areas of focus, heavily influenced by the ILO Guidelines on JT:⁹ILO, “Guidelines for a just transition towards environmentally sustainable economies and societies for all,” 2015, available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_432859.pdfILO, “The ILO at COP28,” 2023, available at https://live.ilo.org/events/ilo-cop28-2023-12

• JT pathways should be context-specific, nationally owned, and designed to address energy, workforce, and socioeconomic dimensions while promoting local development priorities and social protection plans.
• JT pathways should be aligned with low-carbon climate-resilient development pathways, as well as adaptation priorities and poverty eradication.
• JT pathways should be workforce-centered, emphasizing decent work and quality jobs, social protection, and labor rights.
• Inclusive participation and social dialogue are essential to ensure that “no one is left behind”.
• International cooperation is a key factor in achieving a just transition.

Throughout the negotiations, the JT was addressed in multiple streams, including adaptation, mitigation, loss and damage, and the Global Stocktake (GST). In fact, the GST includes several mentions of the JT and climate justice, making it a central theme of the text.¹⁰UNFCCC, “COP28 Agreement Signals ‘Beginning of the End’ of the Fossil Fuel Era,” 13 December 2023, available at https://unfccc.int/news/cop28-agreement-signals-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-fossil-fuel-era These efforts also culminated in another milestone when world leaders declared their commitment to a gender-driven JT through a “gender-responsive just transition and climate action” partnership.¹¹COP28, “COP28 Gender-Responsive Just Transitions and Climate Action Partnership,” 2023b, available at https://www.cop28.com/en/cop28-gender-responsive-just-transitions-and-climate-action-partnership The statement reaffirms commitments to gender equality, recognizes the significant roles of women and girls in climate action and decision-making, and highlights the intersectionality of climate change, which disproportionately impacts women. The statement also calls for gender-responsive strategies in mitigation and adaptation efforts, including gender-responsive budgeting, policies, and legislation.

On the ground, COP28 was a burgeoning space for various events, dialogues, and workshops that addressed different aspects of the JT. For the first time, the Blue Zone, dedicated to formal official negotiations, hosted the negotiations of the Civil Society Climate Justice Hub, a space for and managed by civil society actors (CSCJ, 2023). This allowed the global climate justice movement to unite, expand, articulate demands, and position climate justice at the center of the global climate discourse, alongside other key voices from the Indigenous People’s Pavilion, the Women and Gender Pavilion, and the Youth Hub. The perspectives emanating from these platforms brought a deeply intersectional view of just transition, rooted in rights-based approaches for women, indigenous peoples, youth, workers, persons with disabilities, local communities, and other vulnerable groups. Narratives on JT included meaningful dialogue and engagement, power and wealth redistribution, sovereignty and decoloniality, the dignity of communities, land and spatial justice, trade inequalities, reparations and debt cancelation, climate litigation, intergenerational justice, demilitarization, global climate and energy justice, activism, and strategies for debunking false solutions. In short, the discourses highlighted the stories and demands of frontline communities calling for people-centered systemic change through a shift from the current extractivist capitalist system to a regenerative economy.

On the other hand, a more mainstream discourse of the JT dominated the discussions. In the Just Transition Pavilion, co-hosted by the ILO and the European Commission (EC), the framings of the JT were focused on social dialogue, decent jobs, upskilling and reskilling of the workforce, social protection and security, occupational hazards, effective partnerships, entrepreneurship, green enterprise development, inclusion and empowerment of women and youth, and addressing other existing labor market inequalities.¹²ILO, “The ILO at COP28,” 2023, available at https://live.ilo.org/events/ilo-cop28-2023-12 Discussions there mainly framed the JT as an economic tool that could enable green growth and inclusive development, while ensuring that no one is left behind. Financing issues focused primarily on market-driven solutions, highlighting the importance of the financial viability of projects, blended and innovative financing, carbon markets, and private sector engagement. Generally, discussions emphasized technocratic solutions that maintain the status quo. For example, a session on JT in the MENA region, hosted by the ILO and the Islamic Development Bank, put forward solutions that were considered controversial by activists and civil society organizations, when presenting different JT pathways for the region. These included economic and employment projects linked to investment in green hydrogen and subsequent export to EU countries, export and e-car manufacturing, and compensation for profits from stranded assets of oil and gas companies (ILO, 2023d). The focus on green hydrogen, a highly contested technology, especially in the water-stressed and land-scarce MENA region, and other export-driven technologies further attest to the “neoliberal” nature of the solutions adopted by the ILO so far.

A joint ILO and IsDB report also highlights that decarbonization pathways and green industrial growth have the capacity to create up to 10 million new jobs in MENA¹³SDB, The social, economic and employment impacts of decarbonization and green industrial growth scenarios for the Middle East and North Africa region, 2023, available at https://www.ilo.org/publications/social-economic-and-employment-impacts-decarbonization-and-green-industrial . The largest job gains are expected in the construction and green hydrogen sectors, followed by motor vehicle manufacturing. However, the report overlooks significant challenges pertaining to the potential of decarbonization pathways to create decent and local jobs, particularly concerning technology transfer and intellectual property rights. The report primarily emphasizes policy options based on “technology diffusion” models instead of promoting technological capacity development models that would involve the transfer of knowledge for local manufacturing, thereby promoting local economic development and sustainable job creation. Moreover, given that the solutions presented are predominantly export-oriented, their impact on local jobs is expected to be limited. While this approach can lead to increased revenues from exports, jobs created in export-oriented industries may not always be accessible to local communities or may require specialized skills and knowledge that are not readily available locally. A more nuanced approach is therefore essential to ensure that decarbonization efforts in the MENA region not only create jobs but also prioritize local economic development and equitable access to employment opportunities.

Nonetheless, Global South panelists in the JT Pavilion often challenged the dominant discourse and brought alternative perspectives to the table. In a session on South Africa’s lessons learned from the JT, participants discussed the World Bank-funded project implemented by ESKOM (the national power utility) to decommission and reuse the Komati coal-fired power plant in the coal-rich Mpumalanga province. The plant, which was shut down in October 2022, was nearing the end of its life and was only partially operational with a capacity of 125 MW. In this context, the project aimed to transform the power station into a renewable energy training facility, with the installation of renewable energy solutions, as well as reskilling and upskilling programs for workers transitioning to renewable energy and the provision of voluntary retirement packages. In this session, participants raised the importance of three core principles of the JT adopted by the South African government in its JT framework: restorative, distributive, and procedural justice. For the first time in the JT Pavillion, the discussion unpacked the meaning of justice through the three different principles. Restorative justice aims to address and repair harm to communities; in South Africa’s case, this included communities facing significant health impacts from coal mining. Distributive justice refers to the fair distribution of resources, benefits, and opportunities to empower communities. Procedural justice was defined as meaningful and continuous participation in the design and planning of the future of communities at every stage of proposed projects and plans. In this session, community and trade union representatives accused the technocrats of “painting a good picture, not a real picture”¹⁴ILO, “Lessons and recommendations from South Africa’s First Just Transition Project,” 09 December 2023, available at https://live.ilo.org/events/ilo-cop-28-events-just-transition-pavilion-day-8-morning-2023-12-09 of the decommissioning of Komati plant and asserted that the project did not constitute a just transition. They further highlighted the central role of agency and self-determination of communities and workers in every step of the JT process.

Similarly, at the high-level opening of the JT Pavilion, voices from the Global South challenged the discourse on access to finance, emphasizing that “the climate crisis is primarily a debt crisis for developing countries”¹⁵ILO, “High-Level Panel: Putting the Just Transition into Practice by Integrating Trade Unions in the JETP,” 02 December 2023, available at https://live.ilo.org/events/ilo-cop-28-events-just-transition-pavilion-day-2-afternoon-2023-12-02 . In contrast to the dominant narrative pushing for market-led solutions, participants argued for more equitable means of financing, referring to the Accra-Marrakesh-Agenda (A2M) and the Bridgetown 2.0 Initiative. In the short term, the Bridgetown 2.0 initiative aims to expand the lending capabilities of vulnerable countries, while the A2M aims to provide debt relief, reduce the cost of capital, and restructure international and development finance systems. Finally, in this high-level opening session, a representative of indigenous peoples’ organizations reminded the panel that the spatial dimension of the JT had been largely ignored in the conversation, emphasizing the need to speak about land justice for communities and indigenous peoples.

Overall, the JT Pavilion was a space that strongly reflected the tripartite structure of the ILO, which fosters social dialogue between governments, employers (private sector), and employees. And while workers and communities were given a seat at the table at the COP, this “cooperative” and balanced nature of the discussions limited the opportunity for strong language on JT. Such language is necessary to drive transformative change and outcomes. In addition, while jobs and labor were quickly identified as affected sectors, the same attention was not given does not apply to citizens and communities, revealing the co-optation of the JT concept in an attempt to mitigate its radical potential. Overall, the JT events demonstrated the plurality of narratives on just transition; however, this diversity also means that the road ahead will be challenging. Because definitions of JT are scattered and often contradictory, JT efforts and interventions will be difficult to design, implement, and track. Stronger language and specific guidelines are needed to ensure coherence and effectiveness across various contexts and stakeholders, while recognizing context-specific layers and place-based definitions of the just transition.

An ‘Inevitably’ Just Transition?

While world leaders and technocrats congratulated themselves on the procedures and outcomes of the COP, frontline communities, indigenous peoples, climate justice groups, and experts were highly critical of the “business as usual approach”.¹⁶Nina Lakhani, “Indigenous people and climate justice groups say Cop28 was ‘business as usual’,” 13 December 2023, available at, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/13/indigenous-people-and-climate-justice-groups-say-cop28-was-business-as-usual Tensions between the two groups over common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and more ambitious climate action were central to the dynamics of the negotiations. Grassroots movements were frustrated by the overuse of strong buzzwords and the lack of clear language adopted by policymakers, which risk turning the just transition into an empty signifier that instead deepens existing inequalities. Similarly, the widening gap between rhetoric and action, and the insufficiency of proposed actions became a growing source of tension, particularly for climate justice.

For example, the GST recognizes the need to “phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that do not address energy poverty or just transitions, as soon as possible”.¹⁷UNFCCC, “COP28 Agreement Signals ‘Beginning of the End’ of the Fossil Fuel Era,” 13 December 2023, available at https://unfccc.int/news/cop28-agreement-signals-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-fossil-fuel-era However, in the absence of clear definitions of all the terms mentioned, this sentence sets the ground for incoherent action with (un)intended consequences. The lack of differentiated goals and time-bound targets for less developed countries in the Global South compared to their industrialized counterparts also fails to account for differentiated responsibilities. This is particularly worrying as phasing out “inefficient” subsidies without access to just financial mechanisms would have severe consequences for developing countries already struggling with debt. In the absence of a clear JT definition, this raises another important question: how will just transition projects and subsequent funding be tracked? In a session in the JT Pavilion that reviewed the evidence on JT interventions to date, the speaker highlighted the difficulty of measuring what counts as a JT project in developing countries. Indeed, given the paucity of interventions in countries of the Global South, when not labeled as such the study[19] (Cameron et al., 2023) considered interventions that target both climate and social/employment goals to constitute as “JT interventions”. Drawing lessons from adaptation, which also relies on hyper-local and context-specific interventions, the lack of specific and measurable targets and guidelines would considerably hinder financial and political action for the JT. And while the ILO Guidelines¹⁸ILO, “Guidelines for a just transition towards environmentally sustainable economies and societies for all,” 2015, available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_432859.pdfILO, “The ILO at COP28,” 2023, available at https://live.ilo.org/events/ilo-cop28-2023-12 provide a strong backbone for labor issues, they do not address other cross-cutting dimensions of the just transition, nor the perspective of non-oil producing countries. A robust and unifying framework for the JT is therefore essential. However, this framework needs to go beyond the working program and be framed under a global goal for just transition. Again, the experience of the case of adaptation warns of a challenging road ahead, as continuous disagreements about the global adaptation goals and their metrics and indicators continue to hinder progress since their announcement in the 2015 Paris Agreement.

On the other hand, shortcomings in the GST have implications for future just transition efforts. Indeed, mentions of a rights-based approach for all frontline communities have been restricted as components to merely “respect, promote, and consider” when designing climate action. And while CM4.1 recognizes labor rights as an essential component of the just transition, the GST failed to include any mention of workers’ rights in its text. Other gaps include acknowledgments of structural inequalities stemming from trade distortions and protectionism, as well as unjust taxation systems established unilaterally for developing countries. One example is the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), a greenhouse gas mitigation initiative that applies to imported goods and has adverse consequences for vulnerable communities. Indeed, research indicates that as a direct result of CBAM, a decrease in African exports can reduce the continent's GDP by at least 1.12%, which amounts to $ 25 billion in losses per year.¹⁹LSE, “Africa could lose up to billion per annum as a direct result of the EU's CBAM,” 2023, available at https://www.lse.ac.uk/News/Latest-news-from-LSE/2023/e-May-2023/Africa-could-lose-up-to-25-billion-per-annum-as-a-direct-result-of-the-EUs-CBAM It is imperative to avoid such inequities and ensure that the transition does not exacerbate the vulnerability of already vulnerable countries. Similarly, the complete exclusion of the climate costs of war and militarization in the GST poses a significant threat to climate action and justice. Indeed, the COP in general largely overlooked the war in Gaza, where Israel has been committing an ongoing genocide against the Palestinian people since October 7, 2023. Beyond the catastrophic and devastating loss of life, it is estimated that in the first 60 days of Israel's military offensive, emissions from its operations exceeded those of the annual production of the Central African Republic, equivalent to burning more than 150,000 tons of coal.²⁰Benjamin Neimark, Patrick Bigger, Francis Otu-Larbi, and Rachel Larbi, “A Multitemporal Snapshot of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from the Israel-Gaza Conflict,” 2024, available at SSRN 4684768 As reporting of military emissions is currently carried out on a voluntary basis, issues of transparency need to be further explored. Furthermore, as reiterated by many activists and civil society participants at the COP, there is no justice under occupation, there is no peace without justice, and there is no climate action without peace.

Conclusion

While COP28 demonstrated the plurality of narratives on the just transition and the growing importance of the concept, the competing and often divergent approaches to JT also highlight the challenges ahead. The scattered definitions and contradictory perspectives make it difficult to effectively design, implement, and track just transition efforts. Stronger language and precise guidelines are essential to ensure coherence and effectiveness across various contexts and stakeholders while recognizing the layered complexities of the just transition. The tension between rhetoric and action, particularly around finance and equitable distribution of burdens, remains a recurring theme in COP discussions. The operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund has produced disappointing results, with indications that it will function more as a lending fund rather than a grant-based fund, given it is currently hosted by the World Bank for at least the next four years. As preparations for the upcoming “finance” COP in Azerbaijan unfold, pivotal discussions around the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) are poised to address the inadequacies of current climate finance mechanisms. This goal aims to raise the floor of annual climate finance beyond the current $100 billion target. In particular, the NCQG provides an opportunity to rectify the imbalance in climate finance for developing countries, with a target annual allocation of $400 billion for loss and damage. In navigating these challenges and opportunities, prioritizing equitable climate finance, and strengthening commitments to JT will be essential for fostering just, sustainable, and inclusive global climate action that leaves no one behind.

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The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.